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CIVIL RIGHTS

Can employers exclude women because of concerns
for the health andsafety ofpotentialfetuses?
by Mary E. Becker

International Union, United Automobile,
Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of
America, et al.,
V.
Johnson Controls, Inc.
(Docket No. 89-1215)
Argument Date: Oct. 10, 1990

This is the first time the Court has reviewed an employer
policy limiting women's employment opportunities because of health risks to the next generation. Six lower federal or state courts have considered such cases, and the
.ultimate legal rules could affect women's access to millions
of hazardous jobs.
ISSUE
Does an employer policy excluding from certain hazardous jobs all women who cannot show sterility violate Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964?
FACTS
In 1977, Johnson Controls adopted a policy recommending that women who wanted to have children in the future should avoid lead-exposed jobs. All jobs were,
however, open to women. Women, but not men, were
warned of reproductive risks associated with lead; women
were told that, In posing fetal risks, lead exposure was like
smoking. Despite these warnings, between 1977 and 1982,
eight women (out of an unknown number) became pregnant while holding lead-exposed jobs. Although there were
no birth defects or apparent abnormalities or identifiable
problems as a result of these pregnancies, one child did
have an elevated blood-lead level.
In 1982, Johnson Controls modified its policy to exclude
all women who could not show sterility from jobs involving a certain level of lead exposure. Under this policy, in
effect, women who cannot show sterility are banned from
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all manufacturing and some non-manufacturing jobs in
Johnson Controls' lead battery plants. These plants are in
the Globe Battery Division ofJohnson Controls, Inc., and
are located in a number of states.
Women holding production jobs in these plants at the
time the policies were enacted were transferred without
loss of benefits or base wages unless they could keep their
blood-lead levels below a specified level or show sterility.
Since then. women have not been hired for such jobs unless they can show sterility.
This lawsuit challenging Johnson Control's policy at
these plants was filed in the U.S. District Court in the Eastern District of Wisconsin on April 6, 1984, by eight named
plaintiffs and their union, the UAW. The plaintiffs have been
certified as representing a class of similarly situated employees at the following Globe Battery plants: Garland,
Texas; Holland, Ohio; Fullerton, Calif.; Owosso, Mich.;
Louisville, Ky.; Texarkana, Ark.; Bennington, Vt.; Middletown, Del.; and Atlanta, Ga.
One of the eight named plaintiffs is a male employee,
Donald Penny (a resident of Middletown, Del.), who lost
his job at Johnson Controls' Middletown, Del., plant when
he requested a transfer to a low-lead area while he and his
wife tried to conceive. The transfer was denied and Donald
Penny quit, according to the plaintiffs' complaint, because
of the harassment and intimidation he faced after making
this request. Donald Penney's wife, Anna May Penney, is
also a named plaintiff who worked at the Middletown,
Del., plant. She objected to being required to wear a respirator at lower blood-lead levels than men.
Another plaintiff, Elsie Nason (a resident of Hloosick
Falls, N.Y.), was 50 years old and divorced when she was
removed from her job as a site terminal welder at the Bennington, Vt., plant. Although she was transferred without
loss of base wages, she did lose incentive wages and, according to her affidavit, the satisfaction of a welding job
she had enjoyed. Another plaintiff, Mary Craig (a resident
of Newark, Del.), elected sterilization rather than the insecurity of trying to retain her job by maintaining blood
lead levels below the specified level at the Middletown,
Del., plant. ShirleyJean Mackey (a resident of Atlanta, Ga.)
was transferred from a job as a "COS loader" at the Atlanta, Ga., plant to a job as a container punch operator.
Other named plaintiffs are Lois Sweetman (a resident of
Golts, Md., who worked at the Middletown, Del., plant),
Linda Burdick (a resident of Pound, Vt., who worked at
the Bennington, Vt., plant), and Mary Estelle Schmitt (a
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resident of Cambridge, N.Y., who worked at the Bennington, Vt., plant).
After discovery, the district court granted the company's
motion for summary judgment. The district court held that
the company policy was gender neutral and its disparate
Impact justified by business necessity. 680 FSupp. 309.
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, sitting en
banc, affirmed. 886 F.2d 871. Although the Seventh Circuit did not agree that the policy could be characterized
as gender neutral on its face, the court did agree that the
business necessity defense was available. Once the employer had shown risk of fetal harm through maternal exposure, the burden shifted to the employees to show that
the risks associated with paternal exposure were as serious as the risks associated with maternal exposure (and
that differential standards were therefore inappropriate).
In addition, the court regarded the policy as justified by
the bona ide occupational qualification ("BIFOQ") defense
available in Title VII disparate treatment cases.
Four of the 11 judges on the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit dissented, including two conservative Reagan appointees, Judges Posner and Easterbrook. Judges
Posner and Cudahy dissented on the ground that, although
Johnson Controls might prevail on a BFOQ defense, the
ruling for Johnson Controls on summary judgment was
inappropriate and premature given the conflicting evidence in the record on paternal reproductive risk. Judges
Easterbrook and Flaum dissented on the ground that policies excluding all women who cannot show sterility are
necessarily violations of Title VII; no defense is available
in such cases.
After the Seventh Circuit's decision, a California appellate court ruled for the employee in a case challenging
Johnson Control's policy as implemented at its Fullerton,
Calif., plant. The employee, Queen Elizabeth Foster, applied for a protected job and was denied employment
when she did not produce evidence of sterility. The
California Court of Appeals for the Fourth District, Division Three, held that Johnson Controls' policy violates
California antidiscrimination law. This decision is now final; the California Supreme Court has declined review.
Johnson Controls,Inc. v. California FairEmployment &
Housing Commission, 267 Cal. Rptr. 158 (Cal. App. 4 Dist.
1990), review denied (Calif. S.Ct., May 17, 1990). Thus,
there are now inconsistent legal rules applicable to Johnson Controls' battery plants in California and elsewhere.
BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE
The United States Supreme Court's decision will be important on two levels: policy and statutory construction.
The decision will determine whether many hazardous jobs
(estimates run as high as 20 million) are open to women
who cannot show sterility. The Court's Title VII holding
will determine how sex-specific employment restrictions
are analyzed under Title VII.
The Supreme Court's decision will not, however, affect

the legality of policies in California under California law.
Regardless of how Johnson Controls is decided at the federal level, California employers will not be able to exclude
women to preserve potential fetal health.
On the level of policy, the employer argues that reasonable restrictions on the employment of women to ensure
fetal safety are desirable. Johnson Controls tried a less restrictive policy (in 1978-1982, when it warned women of
risks) and that policy was ineffective (fertile women continued to work in high-lead areas and eight women in such
areas became pregnant).
The employees argue that employers are not the appropriate decisionmakers in this area because employers
tend to exclud women from hazardous jobs only when
women are "marginal" workers. Policies excluding all fertile women have not tended to arise when women are "essential" workers, i.e., when most workers are women. Yet
such jobs are often as hazardous as men's job. The employees argue that if employers can decide when to restrict
women's job opportunities because of fetal risks, women
will continue to face identical or equivalent risks in
women's jobs, but for the lower pay and weaker medical
benefits typically associated with women's jobs.
In deciding that the risks to future potential fetuses are
outweighed by the advantages of a hazardous job, a woman
must weigh, not only her own needs for income and medical insurance, but also those of her living children and
her other economic responsibilities. According to the employees, when an employer assumes that fetal health
should be protected by exclusionary policies, it fails to appreciate women's economic responsibilities to their living
and unconceived children.
The employees also note that Congress has designated
OSHA as the appropriate decisionmaker on questions of
workplace safety. After extensive hearings on a new lead
standard in the seventies, OSI IAdetermined that there was
no scientific basis for creating differential occupational lead
exposure standards for women and men.
Johnson Controls points out that it has a duty, recognized in tort, to avoid harm to future generations. But the
employees argue that employer decisions are unlikely to
protect future generations when the danger arises from
low-paid women's jobs with weak medical benefits. It is
not in the interest of living or potential children to have
their mothers working in low-paid hazardous women's jobs
with weak medical benefits rather than higher-paying hazardous men's jobs with more robust medical benefits.
In addition, the workers say employers should be concerned about tort liability as a result of paternal,as well
as maternal, exposure. Such suits would be difficult to win
(no child has ever won a litigated case alleging harm
through parental occupational exposure). But there have
been more documented allegations of harm in general associated with paternal occupational exposure than with
maternal occupational exposure. And for lead, many experts (some of whose affidavits are in the record) regard
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current evidence of reproductive risk to be as serious for
men as for women.
The statutory questions are complex. The initial question is whether one should analyze Johnson Controls'
policy as a form of "disparate treatment" or "disparate Impact." Disparate treatment refers to differential treatment
of people on the basis of their race or sex. This type of
case is based on the language of the statute, which provides that an employer cannot "limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any
way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual
of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." Title VII §
703(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2).
There is a single statutory defense to a differential treatment case of sex discrimination, the so-called "BFOQ" defense: such discrimination is permissible "in those certain
instances where... sex... is a bona fide occupational
qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation
of that particular business or enterprise." Title VII § 703(e),
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e). This defense has been rather narrowly interpreted.
A disparate impact case is a challenge to a facially neutral policy or practice which has a disparate impact on
women or a minority group. Most disparate impact cases
have challenged tests, educational qualifications, or similar "objective" criteria. This cause of action is not grounded
explicitly (n any precise statutory language, but is based
on a 1971 Supreme Court case recognizing this cause of
action and describing a defense: business necessity. Griggs
t.Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). Business necessity is a relatively flexible defense. In recent cases, the Supreme Court has indicated that the employer need only
articulate a legitimate business reason. See, e.g., Wards
Cote Packing Co., Inc. tn Alonio, 109 S.Ct. 2115 (1989).
What is at stake in deciding whether to use disparate
treatment or disparate impact to analyze Johnson Controls'
fetal vulnerability policy? The burden on the employer is
much lighter in a disparate impact case. In a treatment case,
once the plaintiff establishes that the employer actually
treats women and men differently, the employer cannot
merely justify a legitimate business purpose but must establish that sex is a BFOQ for the job in question.
Although the Johnson Controls policy overtly treats
women and men differently (only women are required to
show sterility to hold certain jobs), the district court analyzed the case as disparate impact rather than disparate
treatment. It explained that when a policy applies to only
women, there is only a presumption that it is facially discriminatory, and that presumption can be rebutted by
showing that there are risks of harm to the next generation as a result of maternal occupational exposure. After
determining that disparate impact applied, the district
court found that the employer had borne the burden of
establishing a defense of business necessity.

Tlhe Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed with
this result-the application of the business necessity defense toJohnson Controls' policy-but rejected the characterization of the policy (which applied only to women) as
facially neutral. Instead, the Seventh Circuit held that the
business necessity defense was available in disparate treatment cases challenging fetal vulnerability policies. In addition, the Seventh Circuit held that sex was justified as
a bona fide occupational qualification for the jobs in
question.
It seems unlikely that the Supreme Court will hold that
the policy is not facially discriminatory when it so clearly
discriminates on its face between women and men. (It is
also unlikely that the Court will allow the business necessity defense in a treatment case.) Indeed, in their briefs the
parties agree that the Johnson Controls' policy is overt disparate treatment and that the key question is the availability of the BFOQ defense.
Thus, in the Supreme Court, the key question is the
scope of the BFOQ defense. lHow the Court will rule on
this issue is not clear. In the past, sex has been recognized
as a legitimate BFOQ in narrow circumstances somewhat
different from Johnson Controls' situation. In one of the
rare cases recognizing sex as a BFOQ on safety grounds,
the jobs were contract positions as guards in a highsecurity male prison, 20 percent of whose occupants were
sex offenders. In that case, the Supreme Court regarded
sex (male) as a BFOQ because a woman's "very womanhood" could threaten prison security in the event a sex
offender or other prisoner attacked her. Dotbard n
Ratwlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 336 (1977). The Court indicated
that "an employer could rely on the bfoq exception... by
proving 'that he had reasonable cause to believe, that is,
a factual basis for believing, that all or substantially all
women would be unable to perform safely and efficiently
the duties of the job involved."' Id. at 333 (quoting Weeks
t, Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F2d 228, 235 (5th
Cir. 1969)).
Although the existing cases do not recognize a BFOQ
defense in circumstances precisely likeJohnson Controls,
there is some support for extending the BFOQ to this situation. In a 1985 age discrimination case, the Court recognized age (less than 60) as a BFOQ defense for flight
engineers. In that case, arising under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA'), the Court explained that
the BFOQ analysis must "'adjust[] to the safety factor'"
where "'reasonably necessary' to further the overriding
interest in public safety." Western Air Lines, Inc. v.
Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 413 (1985)(quoting Usery t, Tamiand 7all Tours, hIc., 531 F.2d 224, 236 (5th Cir. 1976)).
The Court concluded that "In adopting [the BFOQ] standard, Congress did not ignore the public interest in safety."
Id. at 419.
The language of the basic BFOQ provisions in Title VII
and the ADEA are identical: Sex or age discrimination is
permissible "where [sex or age]... is a bona fide occupa-
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tional qualification reasonably necessary to the normal
operation of the (or that] particular business." ADEA §
4(0(l), 29 U.S.C. § 623(0(1); Title VI! § 703(e), 42 U.S.C.
§ 20002-2(e). But Title Vil does include additional language
that might be interpreted as limiting the availability of the
BFOQ in the context of fetal vulnerability policies. In 1978,
Congress amended Title VII to include pregnancy and
related medical conditions as forms of sex discrimination.
(This amendment was designed to overrule General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976), in which the Court
had held that distinctions based on pregnancy were not
forms of sex discrimination.)
The Pregnancy Discrimination Act goes on to state that
'women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all
employment-related purposes... as other persons not so
affected but similar in their ability or inability to work."
Title VII § 701(k), 42 U.S.C. 2000e(k). This language, read
literally, states that female fertility (a medical condition
related to pregnancy) cannot be the basis for limiting
women's employment opportunities unless fertile women
are treated like others who are similar in ability to do the
vork.
The Court is most likely to take one of two approaches:
hold that all policies limiting the employment of fertile
women are impermissible distinctions based on sex, or
hold that some policies are permissible (under the BFOQ
provision) if supported by sufficient evidence. The Court
is less likely to affirm the Seventh Circuit's holding that
once the employer shows evidence of fetal risk through
maternal exposure, the burden is on the employees to
show identical risk through paternal exposure. In imposing this burden on the employees, the Seventh Circuit relied on Wards Cove Packing Co. v, Atonio, 109 S.Ct 2115
(1989), a Supreme Court case describing the business
necessity defense in a disparate impact case.Johnson Controls is, however, a disparate treatmentcase. The Supreme
Court placed a somewhat similar burden on the employer
in a case in which the employee had shown that differential treatment on the basis of sex was a significant factor
in an employment decision. See Price Waterhouse t lopkins, 109 S.Ct. 1775 (1989).
In reaching its decision on the meaning of Title VII, the
members of the Court are likely to be strongly influenced
by their views on the underlying policy question: Should
individual employers be able to determine whether to
close hazardous jobs to women because of the risk of fetal harm? In the end, a number of perceptions are likely
to be key: perceptions about the hazards associated with
women's (low-paying) jobs and the importance of women's
economic responsibilities; about the likelihood of women's
hazardous jobs being closed to women to protect fetal
health; about the likelihood of tort liability being imposed
on employers for children of female (but not male) workers; about the relative risks associated with maternal and
paternal occupational exposure; and about the nature of

risk and our ability to avoid it entirely.
ARGUMENTS
For International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of
America, et al. (Counsel of Record, Marsha S. Berzon,
177 Post Street, San Francisco,CA 94108; telephone (415)
421-7151):
1. Johnson Controls' fetal protection policy constitutes facial discrimination on the basis of sex.
2. Johnson Controls' fetal protection policy cannot be
justified as a bona ide occupational qualification within
the meaning of Section 703(e) of Title VII.
ForJohnson Controls, Inc. (Counsel of Record, Stanley S. Jaspan, Foley & Lardner 777 East Wisconsin Avenue Milwaukee, WI 53202; telephone (414) 271-2400):
1. Title VII allows an employer to adopt a gender-drawn
fetal protection policy in certain narrow circumstances
under the bona fide occupational qualification defense
of Section 703(e); Johnson Controls' policy meets this
standard.
2. The judgment below should be affirmed because a)
there were no issues of fact with respect to risks associated with paternal exposure so disputed that
reasonable fact-finders could disagree; and b) the protesting employees had not suggested any less restrictive alternatives to the challenged policy.
AMICUS BRIEFS
In Support of International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, et al.
1. The United States (Counselof Record, Kenneb IV Star,
Solicitor General, Department ofJustice, Washington,
DC 20530; telephone (202) 514-2217) and the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (Charles A.
Shano, General Counsel, EEOC, Washington, DC
20507) filed a brief arguing that the only defense to the
overt disparate treatment challenged in this case is the
bona ide occupational qualification defense of Section
703(e) and that Johnson Controls had not met its burden of justifying this policy under the bona ide occupational qualification defense.
2. The NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc.
and the National Black Women's Ilealth Project (Counsel of Record, Ronald L. Ellis, 99 Hudson St., 16th
Floor,Neu' Ybrk, NY 10013: telephone (212) 219-1900)
filed a brief arguing, among other things, that minorities are particularly vulnerable to policies that protect
health by excluding certain classes or workers from the
workplace, and that good-paying jobs (with good health
insurance) are essential for the well-being of minority
women and the living children for whom they are economically responsible.
3. American Public llealth Association; American Nurses
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.4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

Association; American Society of Law and Medicine;
Association for Women in Science; Department of Public I lealth, Commonwealth of Massachusetts; Environmental Defense Fund; Executive Office of Labor,
Commonwealth of Massachusetts; Occupational and
Environmental Reproductive Hazards Clinic and Education Center; Society of American Law Teachers;
'lbxics Use Reduction Institute; and 20 individuals
(Counsel of Record, Nadine Ttub, Rutgers Univtersit ,
School of Law, 15 Washington St., Newark, NJ 07102;
telephone (201) 648-5637).
Equal Rights Advocates, the NOW Legal Defense and
Education Fund, National Women's Law Center, and
Women's Legal Defense Fund (Counsel of Record, Sitsan Deller Ross, Georgetown Universit , Sex Discrinination Clinic 600 NetuJers9 , Ave, N.W, Washington,
DC 20001; telephone (202) 662-9640).
American Civil Liberties Union and the American Civil
Liberties Union-Wisconsin; Amalgamated Clothing and
Textile Workers Union; and 46 other organizations and
18 individual workers (Counsel of Record, Joan h. Bertit', ACIU Foundation, 132 iest 43rd St., New brk,
NY 10036; telephone (212) 944-9800).
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. (Counsel of
Record, Thomas 0. McGarity Universili, of Texas
School of Law 727 E. 26th St., Austin, TX 78705; telephone (512) 471-5151).
Trial Lawyers for Public Justice (Counsel of Record, Arthur I1. Bryant, 1625 MassachusettsAte,., NWV, Suite
100, Washington, DC 20036; telephone (202)
797-8600).
Association of the Bar of the City of New York, the Association of Black Women Attorneys, the Committee
on Women's Rights of the New York County Lawyer's
Association, and the New York City Commission on Iluman Rights (Counsel of Record, Arthur Leonard, 42
West 44th St., New lbrk, NY 10036; telephone (212)
382-6600).
State of California and the California Fair Employment
and Ilousing Commission (Counsel of Record, Manuel
M. ledeiros, Deputy Attorney General, PO. Box
944255, Sacramento, CA 94244-2550; telephone (916)
324-7851).

10. Massachusetts, Arizona, Connecticut, Delaware,
Florida, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota,
Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Puerto Rico, Texas, Vermont, the Virgin Islands, and
Washington (Counsel of Record, Marjorie leins, Assistant Attorney General, One Ashbhurtont Place, Boston, MA 02108; telephone (617) 727-2200).
In Support ofJohnson Controls, Itin
I. Industrial hlygiene Law Project (Counsel of Record,
Jack Leti,, 19-21 Warren St., New brk, NY 10007; telephone (212) 732-3358).

2. National Safe Workplace Institute (Counsel of Record,
,lames D. lolzhate, Mayei; Brown & Plat, 190 South
LaSalle St., Chicago, IL 60603; telephone (312)
782-0600).
3. Equal Employment Advisor)' Council and the National
Association of Manufacturers (Counsel of Record, Garen E. Dodge, McGtiness & Villiams, 1015 Fifteenth
St., N.W, Suite 1200, Washington, DC 20005; telephone (202) 789-8600).
4. Concerned Women for America (Counsel of Record,
Jane E. lladro, 370 L'ELnfant Promenade, S.W, Suite
800, Washington, DC 20024; telephone (202)
488-7000).
5. Pacific Legal Foundation (Counsel of Record, Anthonyp
7: Caso, 2700 Gatewvay Oaks Drive, Suite 200,
Sacramento, CA 95833; telephone (916) 641-8888) and
New England Legal Foundation (Stephen S. Ostrach,
150 Lincoln St., Boston, MA 02111; telephone (617)
695-3660).
6. Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America
(Counsel of Record, Timothy B. Dyk, Jones, Day
Reavis & Pogue, 1450 G St., N.W, Washington, DC
20005-2088; telephone (202) 879-3939).
7. Washington Legal Foundation (Counsel of Record, John
C Scull), 1705 N St., N.W, Washington, DC 20036;
telephone (202) 857-0240).
8. United States Catholic Conference (Counsel of Record,
Mark E. Chopko, 3211 4th St., N.E., Washington, DC
20017-1194; telephone (202) 541-3300).
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